Privacy
Verifiable privacy on Maroo — the shielded-pool privacy precompile, the EIP-712 authorized-relay domain, PCL policy enforcement on every privacy call, and the selective-disclosure model compatible with regulator audits.
Privacy
The *WithAuthorization entry points on IPrivacy accept a signature that authorizes a specific executor to run a specific privacy action on behalf of an effective sender. That signature covers an EIP-712 digest whose domain and struct type are fixed by the precompile — the domain is EIP712Domain(name="Maroo Privacy Precompile", version="1", chainId=<EVM chainId>, verifyingContract=<IPrivacy address>), and the primary type is PrivacyActionAuthorization. Both the EVM chain ID (as a uint256) and the Cosmos chain ID (hashed into the struct) are bound into the digest, so a signature produced against one network cannot be replayed on another. Off-chain signers must reconstruct the same domain and struct fields exactly, or the precompile rejects the call with an EOA/ERC-1271/EIP-7702 signer-mismatch string revert.
Most contract-scope PCL enforcement runs through a PCL-wrapped proxy: the proxy's preCall / postCall hooks evaluate the ContractPolicyConfig bound to the proxy address. A policy-aware precompile is different — it is a binary-supported precompile whose code evaluates PCL policy internally at its own precompile boundary. Currently the only policy-aware precompile is the Privacy precompile at 0x100000000000000000000000000000000000000b. Because a precompile is not a deployed contract, it cannot be registered as a PCL proxy and does not go through the proxy hook path; instead its address is bound directly to a ContractPolicyConfig through IPcl.changeContractPolicies, and the precompile reads that configuration on every state-changing call.
The Privacy precompile at 0x100000000000000000000000000000000000000b implements a shielded pool for OKRW. Callers deposit transparent OKRW to commit a note, transfer notes to other recipients under a Groth16 proof, or withdraw a note back to a transparent EOA — each with an EIP-712 *WithAuthorization relay variant and a batch form. Every state-changing call is evaluated by PCL at the precompile boundary — against the contract policies bound to the Privacy precompile's address, before and after the call executes — on top of the global policies the enclosing EVM transaction meets. A PCL rejection at the precompile boundary reverts with a typed IPcl error; other failures now revert with typed custom errors declared on IPrivacy — the ambient shared errors from IPrecompile, the request-lifecycle family (PrivacyNonPayable, PrivacyRequestExpired, PrivacyBatchSizeOutOfRange, PrivacyNativeDenomMismatch), the authorization family (PrivacyInvalidAuthorizationField, PrivacyAuthorizationExpired, PrivacyAuthorizationNonceUsed, PrivacyAuthorizationSignerMismatch, PrivacyAuthorizationRejected, PrivacyInvalidAuthorizationMagic), and the shielded-state family (PrivacyDuplicateNullifier, PrivacyNullifierAlreadySpent, PrivacyDuplicateCommitment, PrivacyCommitmentAlreadyExists, PrivacyMerkleCapacityExceeded, PrivacyTxLimitExceeded, PrivacySenderTxLimitExceeded).
Users control what to reveal (counterparties, amounts, asset types) on a per-transaction basis, and regulators access data within limits defined by law — a design that satisfies privacy and compliance at once.
The execution layer of this model is live on chain: the privacy precompile at 0x1000…000b handles shielded-pool deposits, transfers, and withdrawals verified by zero-knowledge proofs, and every state-changing privacy call passes PCL policy evaluation. The concrete mechanisms are documented in this section's concept pages and the IPrivacy API reference.